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THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF WARRANTLESS
AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES:
UNITED STATES v. ROSS
In United States v. Ross, the United States Supreme Court up-
held a warrantless search of a closed container transported in an
automobile. This case represents a departure from the traditional
rationales underlying the automobile exception to the warrant re-
quirement. This Comment examines the justifications for ex-
panding the scope of warrantless searches under the automobile
exception, and contends that the stated rationales are not consis-
tent with prior law and do not support the decision. This Com-
ment also argues that the holding in Ross requires an
abandonment of the expansion of warrantless searches under the
search incident to arrest exception found in New York v. Belton.
INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly confronted cases testing the permissible scope of war-
rantless searches.' The Court has consistently held that warrant-
less searches are reasonable only in "a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions. 2 The rationale for
this limited allowance of warrantless searches springs from the
fourth amendment to the Constitution.3 The fourth amendment
1. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); LaFave, Warrantiess Searches and the Supreme Court: Further
Ventures into the "Quagmire", 8 Cram. LAw BULL. L. 9 (1972).
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see Comment, The Automo-
bile Exception: A Contradiction in Fourth Amendment Principles, 17 SAN DiEGo
L. REV. 933 (1980).
3. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. MV.
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requires that searches must be reasonable to be valid.4 The Court
has said that the warrant requirement insures this
reasonableness.
5
Through the warrant requirement, the Court has recognized the
important function served by a neutral and detached magistrate.
6
The magistrate checks overzealous police. Prior review of police
action by the magistrate prevents some unjustified searches, 7 pre-
vents hindsight from distorting the evaluation of the reasonable-
ness of a search,8 and reassures the public that the orderly
process of law has been respected.9 For these reasons, the Court
has traditionally held that searches conducted without a warrant
are per se unreasonable absent some overriding exigency.10
At the same time, this fourth amendment protection must be
balanced against the responsibility of the police to investigate
crime and apprehend criminals. The Court often finds itself dis-
tinguishing between shades of gray in balancing these sometimes
competing values. In this effort, the Court has created much con-
fusion for police and private individuals alike. To effectively bal-
ance these competing values, the Court has fashioned several
exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement." Two
of these exceptions, search incident to a lawful arrest and the
movable vehicle exception, have been the subject of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions.12 The effect of these deci-
sions is to expand police authority in making warrantless
searches of automobiles.
In New York v. Belton' 3 and United States v. Ross,14 the Court
set forth a new standard and justification for warrantless searches
of automobiles. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in United
4. Id.
5. E.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
7. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317
(1972).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
9. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2175 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
11. The exceptions can be illustrated with several cases: Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499 (1978) (emergency circumstances); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (search incident to a lawful arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop
and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (loss or destruction of evidence); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (movable vehicles).
12. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); and United States v. Ross, 102 S.
Ct. 2157 (1982); respectively.
13. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
14. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
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States v. Ross,15 implicitly created a "search pursuant to the auto-
mobile" exception to the warrant requirement.16 This exception
is based on the peculiarity of the automobile. The majority in
Ross found that this peculiarity alone justifies an exception to the
warrant requirement. 7
This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court
has set forth a new exception to the warrant requirement and cre-
ated a "bright-line" rule that will aid police officers in conducting
searches of automobiles by simplifying, although not to the extent
the Court had hoped, the law. This Comment also contends that
the decision in United States v. Ross compels an abandonment of
the rationale of New York v. Belton, a case decided only eleven
months prior to Ross.18 Regardless of the Court's stated rationale
in Belton, the underlying premise was that articulated in Ross-
the peculiarity of the automobile. As such, Belton foreshadows
Ross, even though Belton was decided under the search incident
to arrest exception rather than the movable vehicle exception. As
a practical matter, all future cases involving warrantless searches
of automobiles must be decided under Ross' newly created
"search pursuant to the automobile" exception to the warrant
requirement.
UNITED STATES V. Ross
On June 1, 1982, the United States Supreme Court decided
United States v. Ross. District of Columbia police, acting on an
informer's tip that Ross was selling drugs from the trunk of his
car, stopped Ross and asked him to get out of his vehicle. While
the police were searching Ross, one of the officers noticed a bullet
on the front seat. A pistol was found in the glove compartment
during a search of the car and Ross was arrested and handcuffed.
An officer then opened the trunk with Ross' keys and discovered
a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and discovered
small glassine packets of white powder, later found to be heroin.
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 54-71.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
18. The case of Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), was explicitly over-
ruled by United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2172. Robbins was decided the same
day as Belton (July 1, 1981), and, in fact, the Court commented on the remarkable
similarity in the facts of the two cases. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 444 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
The car was then taken to headquarters where another warrant-
less search of the trunk uncovered a brown leather pouch con-
taining $3,200. The money and the heroin were admitted into
evidence by the district court over the objection of the defend-
ant's counsel. Ross was convicted, but the court of appeals re-
versed, disallowing the search of the pouch. The court of appeals
then reheard the case en banc, and disallowed the search of the
paper bag as well as the pouch.19
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that police
officers may conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle, in-
cluding closed containers therein, to the extent that a magistrate
could so authorize by warrant.2 0 The only requirement for this
warrantless search was that of probable cause to believe that the
automobile contained contraband somewhere within it.21 Be-
cause a warrant to search Ross' automobile would allow the of-
ficer to open any closed containers inside the automobile, the
search of both the paper bag and the pouch were held to be
permissible.22
United States v. Ross was an attempt by the Court to resolve a
difficult area of fourth amendment law. The Court adopted a
"bright-line" rule that increases the scope of warrantless searches
of automobiles. In examining the rationales employed in cases
using the movable vehicle exception prior to Ross, it becomes
clear that the Court in Ross did not rely on those traditional justi-
fications. Rather than basing the Ross holding on the exigency of
mobility of the automobile 23 or the diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in the automobile, 24 the Court created a "search pursuant to
the automobile" exception to the warrant requirement based
solely on the peculiarity of the automobile.25 This exception now
justifies the warrantless search of closed containers found in
automobiles.
Historical Background of the Movable Vehicle Exception
The movable vehicle exception was created in Carroll v. United
States.26 During prohibition federal agents stopped a car which
informants had identified as carrying bootleg liquor. The agents
19. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc), rev'd, 102 S.
Ct. 2157 (1982).
20. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2160-62.
21. Id. at 2164.
22. Id. at 2168.
23. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
24. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 54-71.
26. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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searched the car and discovered sixty-eight bottles of gin and
whiskey hidden inside the seat. The Supreme Court reasoned
that an exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment for a search of an automobile was appropriate when a
law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains contraband. This exception was deemed necessary be-
cause automobiles could be moved quickly from the jurisdiction
before police could obtain a warrant.27 This exigency was origi-
nally the only justification for the movable vehicle exception.
In 1970 the Court expanded the movable vehicle exception in
Chambers v. Maroney.28 Unlike Carroll, the automobile in Cham-
bers was not searched immediately when it was stopped. Instead
it was taken to the police station, impounded, and then searched.
Although an exigency of mobility existed when the automobile
was stopped, this was not true after it was at the station.29 Never-
theless, the Court upheld the search on exigency grounds.30
The Chambers decision was justified, in retrospect, in United
States v. Chadwick.31 In Chadwick the Court stated that there
was a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile.3 2 This
diminished expectation, coupled with the "inherent" mobility of
automobiles, justified the search at the station house in Cham-
bers.33 There is confusion in this area because the Court has not
properly resolved the question of whether exigency or privacy
grounds control the analysis of what constitutes a reasonable
warrantless search.34
Automobiles and Closed Containers
The cases of United States v. Chadwick35 and Arkansas v.
Sanders36 preceded United States v. Ross and held that closed
containers in an automobile are not subject to warrantless
27. Id. at 149-50.
28. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
29. See Comment, supra note 2, at 939-40.
30. Id. at 51-52.
31. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
32. Id. at 12.
33. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979).
34. For a discussion of the competing policies, and the interpretations of the
fourth amendment from which they sprang, see Weinreb, Generalities of the
Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 47 (1974).
35. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
36. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
searches under the movable vehicle exception. Rather than al-
lowing immediate warrantless searches of closed containers
within automobiles suspected to contain contraband, the Court
required law enforcement officers to seize the containers, obtain a
warrant, and then conduct the search of the container. The ra-
tionale embraced was that an individual has a higher expectation
of privacy in the container than in the automobile itself.
37
In Chadwick, federal railroad agents became suspicious of a
two-hundred-pound footlocker later found to be filled with mari-
juana. Narcotics agents met the train in Boston and tailed the
footlocker until it was picked up by Chadwick and placed in the
trunk of his car. The agents then seized the locker, transported it
to a safe place, and opened it without a warrant. The Court ex-
amined the issue of whether closed containers in automobiles
were subject to a warrantless search under the movable vehicle
exception, and determined that neither exigency of mobility nor
diminished expectation of privacy justifications for the movable
exception-applied to closed containers in such automobiles.
The government argued that closed containers had the same
type of mobility as automobiles, and should be subject to
searches under the movable vehicle exception. The Court re-
jected this argument, saying that, "a person's expectations of pri-
vacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an
automobile."38 TheCourt also noted that the practical problems
of storing seized automobiles are greater than those associated
with storing seized luggage.39 In Chadwick the Court was
presented with both traditional justifications for the automobile
exception: exigency of mobility and diminished expectation of
privacy. It rejected both under the facts of the case. The Court
did not state which justification it believed more forceful.
40
Similarly, the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders41 invalidated a war-
rantless search of a closed container in an automobile. The only
factual difference between Chadwick and Sanders was that the
automobile was moving in Sanders42 and parked in Chadwick.
The Court held this distinction insufficient to bring the Sanders
search under the movable vehicle exception.
In Sanders the police received a tip that Sanders would be ar-
riving at the Little Rock airport on a certain commercial flight
with a green suitcase full of marijuana. The police staked out the
37. See id. at 762-65.
38. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
39. Id. at n.7.
40. Id. at 13.
41. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
42. Id. at 755.
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airport, and observed Sanders arrive as predicted with the green
suitcase. Sanders and a companion put the suitcase in the trunk
of a taxi and drove away. The police officer stopped the taxi a few
blocks from the airport, opened the trunk and searched the suit-
case-all without a warrant. The trial court allowed the seized
marijuana into evidence, but the Arkansas Supreme Court re-
versed and held the search unlawful. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed,43 stating:" "[T]he extent to which the Fourth
Amendment applies to containers and other parcels depends not
at all upon whether they are seized from an automobile."44
ROBBINs V. CALIFORNIA Foreshadowing Ross
In Robbins v. California45 a divided Court held that the war-
rantless search of packages hidden in the tailgate wheelwell of a
station wagon was unreasonable. A plurality said that Robbins
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the container. The rest
of the Court remained unconvinced; clearly, the Court was dissat-
isfied with the traditional rationales and was perhaps searching
for a new one.
A police officer stopped Robbins for driving erratically. The of-
ficer smelled marijuana smoke, searched the defendant and found
a small vial of liquid. He next searched the interior of the car and
found marijuana. He then opened the tailgate and removed the
wheelwell cover, exposing two packages wrapped in green opaque
plastic. The officer opened the packages and discovered a large
quantity of marijuana in each.
The Robbins decision produced five opinions-none of which
carried a majority. 6 The plurality held that the warrantless
search of the packages was unreasonable. Relying on Sanders,
the opinion focused on an individual's expectation of privacy in
the contents of closed containers. 47 Robbins was a tenuous deci-
sion: the holding that a closed container in an automobile is pro-
tected from warrantless searches to the same extent as a
43. Id.
44. Id. at 764 n.13.
45. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
46. The plurality opinion was delivered by Justice Stewart and joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall and White. Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment. Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens each filed dissenting
opinions. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without joining any
opinion.
47. 453 U.S. at 422-29.
container outside an automobile could only muster the support of
four justices.48 One of these justices, Justice Stewart, would be
retiring at the end of the term. The three dissenting Justices-
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens-apparently agreed
that a warrant should not be required to search a closed container
in an automobile that can be searched under the automobile ex-
ception.49 Two Justices remained: Chief Justice Burger con-
curred in the result but, inexplicably, did not join any opinion;5 0
Justice Powell authored his own separate concurring opinion
based on Arkansas v. Sanders.51 Justice Powell did say, however,
that he found the dissenters' contention "attractive."5 2
With the addition of Justice O'Connor as the potential swing
vote, the situation was ripe for overruling Robbins, which is pre-
cisely the action taken by the Court in United States v. Ross.5 3
After examining the traditional rationales for the movable vehicle
exception, one is hard pressed to justify Ross.
A NEW JUSTIFICATION FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF
AUTOMOBILES
In an attempt to justify the Ross holding under traditional ratio-
nales, Justice Stevens stated that Ross is consistent with Carroll
because both involved a probable cause search of a movable vehi-
cle.54 This belief, however, fails to consider that in Carroll the
search was confined to the automobile itself, not closed contain-
ers within the automobile. Under the exigency of mobility justifi-
cation, this is an important distinction.55 Because containers can
be removed from the vehicle, few of the practical problems inher-
ent in seizing automobiles exist. When seizing an automobile, po-
lice usually have to make arrangements to return the driver and
passengers to their homes.56 The automobile is also such a perva-
sive part of society that depriving a person of the use of an auto-
mobile, even for a few days, may constitute a severe hardship.57
Furthermore, the size of automobiles requires that a large amount
of space be allocated by the police for storage of seized
automobiles. This space is invariably outside, thus necessitating
48. Id. at 422.
49. Each, however, authored a separate dissent. Id.
50. Id. at 429.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 435.
53. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
54. 102 S. Ct. at 2159, 2169.
55. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
56. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
57. Id. at 51.
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security arrangements as well.58
The problems associated with the exigency of mobility for
automobiles do not exist for closed containers. Closed containers
are much easier to store and can be easily seized and transported.
Also, an individual can surrender his luggage to the police and
then go about his business more easily than if his automobile is
seized.5 9 In short, the exigency of mobility that justifies a war-
rantless search of an automobile cannot support the warrantless
search of a closed container-even if that container is carried in-
side an automobile. 60
Neither can the holding in Ross be explained by reference to
the second justification employed in the movable vehicle excep-
tion: the diminished expectation of privacy. This rationale can be
found in United States v. Chadwick.61 The Chadwick Court
stated that a significant expectation of privacy exists in closed
containers that does not exist in automobiles.62 Ross, however,
stated that the fourth amendment protection of containers can
vary in different settings.63 Justice Stevens listed three situations
in which a closed container may be searched. In a border' search
the government's interest in policing its border allows intrusion
into the individual's privacy without a warrant.64 The second ex-
ample is a search incident to arrest. Here the preventive self-de-
fense of the police and the interest in protection against loss of
evidence allow a warrantless search.65 The third example is a
search under a warrant.66 The Ross Court's attempt to equate
these allowable searches with a "search pursuant to the automo-
bile" exception ignores the privacy claim and appears to create a
new warrantless search exception. Rather than justifying the
Ross holding based on the exigency of mobility of an automobile
or the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile, the
58. 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9. Considerations such as these led the Court in Cham-
bers to refrain from deciding which was the greater intrusion on the individual:
the warrantless search of his or her automobile, or the seizure of the automobile
while awaiting a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970).
59. Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52 (seizure of automobile results in
no one being able to use it until a warrant is obtained).
60. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2163.
61. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
62. Id. at 13.
63. 102 S. Ct. at 2171.
64. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 90-99.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
Court created a "peculiarity of the automobile" exception to the
warrant requirement. This exception now justifies the warrant-
less search of closed containers found in automobiles when an of-
ficer has probable cause to believe contraband is present
somewhere in the automobile. While the Court viewed traditional
justifications as valid considerations, practical considerations
served as the underlying rationale in Ross. The Court was per-
suaded by the argument that an automobile should receive spe-
cial consideration.67 Automobiles are extremely prevalent in
society.68 There is also much contact of various types between
police and individuals in automobiles.69 This new rationale, es-
pousing the peculiarity of the automobile, simplifies police work
by allowing more warrantless searches.70 This practical consider-
ation weighed heavily in the Court's decision, because many inci-
dents between police and individuals involve contraband hidden
in automobiles.
7 '
Unanswered Questions in Ross
In Ross Justice Stevens distinguished Chadwick and Sanders
by stating that a warrant is required when police have probable
cause to believe the container conceals contraband before it is
placed in an automobile.7 2 This was the situation in both Chad-
wick and Sanders. In Ross, however, such probable cause did not
exist until after the officers began to search the car. Despite Jus-
tice Stevens' intentions, this distinction may result in serious dif-
ficulties for police officers as well as judges in applying Ross to
future cases.
In both Chadwick and Sanders the Court held that a warrant-
less search of a closed container inside an automobile was not
subject to the movable vehicle exception.7 3 These cases seem to
contradict Ross, since the Court in Ross held that closed contain-
67. 102 S. Ct. at 2164.
68. Id. at 2161.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 2172-73. Of course, the possibility always exists that the warrant-
less search can be lawfully conducted under one of the other exceptions to the
warrant requirement. See supra note 11.
71. 102 S. Ct. at 2161.
72. Id. at 2166-67. The Court also settled an issue left unsettled since Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Note 13 of Sanders stated: "[N]ot all contain-
ers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the
full protection of the Fourth Amendment." 442 U.S. at 764 n.13. Ross holds that
this applies solely to containers that, by their shape or appearance, reveal their
contents. Examples are a gun case or a kit of burglary tools. 102 S. Ct. at 2171.
Ross specifically rejects the contention that there is a constitutional distinction
between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers. 102 S. Ct. at 2165-68.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 35-44.
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ers in any compartment of an automobile may be searched with-
out a warrant. Justice Stevens, however, explained Chadwick
and Sanders in an attempt to reconcile them with Ross.7 4 Neither
case, he states, is really an automobile exception case: "IT] he re-
lationship between the automobile and the contraband was
purely coincidental.... ."75 That is, police had probable cause to
believe the container concealed contraband before it was placed
in the automobile. An individual has a greater expectation of pri-
vacy in closed containers than in automobiles.7 6 Because of this,
probable cause alone is not enough to justify a warrantless search
of closed containers only incidentally connected with auto-
mobiles.7
7
Justice Stevens' attempt to reconcile Ross with Chadwick and
Sanders may cause difficulties. In practice, will a police officer
state that he or she had probable cause regarding the closed
container or regarding the entire automobile? There is ambiguity
involving the probable cause time limit: when does an officer's
probable cause as to a container preclude a warrantless search?
The decision leaves other questions unanswered. When does a
police officer's probable cause belief that a particular container
holds contraband foreclose a warrantless search of that container
if it is in an automobile? Under Chadwick and Sanders, probable
cause formed prior to the container's placement in the automobile
requires a warrant.78 What would be the result, however, if prob-
able cause was formed after the container was placed inside the
vehicle but before a search of the vehicle had begun? One may
envision a hypothetical based loosely on the Ross situation in
which a police officer receives a tip that the suspect is selling her-
oin out of his car in brown paper bags. The police officer ap-
proaches a car matching the description of the suspect's car and
observes a large quantity of identically shaped brown paper bags,
all on the passenger seat and sealed. At this point does the officer
have probable cause as to the bags? Does he or she need a war-
rant to open those bags? Ross does not address these questions.
74. 102 S. Ct. at 2165-68. However, Justice Stevens admitted that Ross "re-
jected some of the reasoning in Sanders." Id. at 2172.
75. Id. at 2167 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 767 (1979) (Burger,
C.J., concurring)).
76. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
77. 102 S. Ct. at 2167.
78. Id.
The holding in Ross tends to reward ignorant police officers.
The police can search a container without a search warrant if they
can "show that the investigating officer knew enough but not too
much, that he had sufficient knowledge to establish probable
cause but insufficient knowledge to know exactly where the con-
traband was located."79 Will a police officer remain intentionally
ignorant to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile? The
temptation is there.
The decision in Ross poses further problems. The majority ig-
nores the value of review by a detached and neutral magistrate.80
A tenet of fourth amendment protection is that a search author-
ized by a warrant is always preferred.8' Ross also fails to address
whether the holding will be applied to vehicles other than
automobiles 82 or to parked automobiles.
83
NEW YORK V. BELTON: JUSTIFYING AN EXPANDED SEARCH OF
AUTOMOBILES PRIOR TO Ross
Eleven months prior to United States v. Ross, the United States
Supreme Court decided New York v. Belton.84 Belton demon-
strates the Court's dissatisfaction with previous decisions dealing
with the search of containers in automobiles. As such, Belton
foreshadows Ross by implicitly holding that the presumptive bur-
den on the police justifies a warrantless search of automobiles.
The Court *explicitly justified Belton under the search incident to
arrest exception. However, similar to the problem in Ross, tradi-
79. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
80. See 102 S. Ct. at 2173-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979) ("[Tlhe few situations
in which a search may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been care-
fully delineated and the 'burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the
need for it.' 1); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is not grasped by zealous of-
ficers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual infer-
ences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id. at 13-14.
82. The peculiarity of the automobile, by definition, casts doubt on such an ex-
pansion to vehicles such as airplanes. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
83. Justice Marshall states in his dissent. "The Court confines its holding to-
day to automobiles stopped on the highway which police have probable cause to
believe contain contraband. I do not understand the Court to address the applica-
bility of the automobile exception rule announced today to parked cars." 102 S. Ct.
at 2174 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
84. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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tional search incident rationales do not support Belton-contrary
to what the Court states.
On April 9, 1978, a state trooper stopped an automobile for
speeding on a New York thruway. There were four men in the
car, including Roger Belton. The officer discovered that none
owned the car and saw an envelope on the floor labeled
"Supergold." He also smelled a distinct odor of marijuana.8 5
Based on these facts the officer ordered the men from the car and
arrested them for unlawful possession of marijuana. Each sus-
pect was then searched and placed at a different location around
the outside of the car. The officer discovered cocaine in the back
seat of the car inside a zippered pocket of Belton's jacket. At trial
Belton moved to suppress the cocaine. The trial court denied the
motion and Belton pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense but
preserved his right for appeal. The appellate division affirmed but
the New York Court of Appeals reversed. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.86
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the search of the jack-
et. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, holding
that in a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest,8 7 the police
can search the entire passenger compartment of an automobile
including the glove compartment, but not the trunk.88 The trunk
was excluded because it was not within the ordinary reach of a
passenger and therefore not justifiable under the traditional
search incident to arrest exception and its rationale. 9
Historical Background of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception
The Court's use of the search incident to arrest exception to
justify the Belton result is problematic because Belton cannot be
justified under traditional search incident rationales. A new ra-
85. Id. at 455-56.
86. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1980),
rev'd, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
87. The use of the word "custodial" injects ambiguity into the Belton holding.
The Court failed to explain whether or not it intended "custodial arrest" to mean
something other than "ordinary arrest." Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion
in Robbins can find no difference of constitutional significance between the two
terms because "[a]ny person lawfully arrested for the pettiest misdemeanor may
be temporarily placed in custody." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 450 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
88. United States v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4.
89. Id. at 460.
tionale must therefore be found or the search incident exception
must be redefined.
The landmark case of Chimel v. CaliforniaO provides the basis
for the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant require-
ment. In Chimel the Court defined the scope of a search incident
to an arrest to include the suspect's person and the area within
his immediate control.91 "Immediate control" was defined as the
area from which the suspect might obtain-a weapon or destroy ev-
idence. 92 The Court reasoned that this limited search was suffi-
cient to ensure protection of the officer and preservation of
evidence.93
United States v. Robinson94 further defined the search incident
to arrest exception. Robinson held that even if the arrest was for
a traffic violation and the subsequent search therefore would not
be for weapons or evidence of a particular crime, the police may
make a warrantless search of the suspect's person, including any
closed containerfound on that person.95 The justification for the
scope of the search including evidence or weapons not related to
the crime for which the suspect was arrested was the act of the
lawful arrest itself.96 This justification is rooted in the "general
authority" to search incident to arrest.9 7 Because the lawful ar-
rest of the individual is a reasonable intrusion on his fourth
amendment rights, the subsequent search of his person, being a
lesser intrusion, would not pass any benefit to the individual if a
warrant were required.98 Therefore, a warrant is not necessary
because the greater privacy right already has been forfeited.99
A New Justification in Belton
The Belton Court attempted to reconcile its holding with tradi-
tional search incident rationales. Justice Stewart stated that the
holding in Belton is justified under the search incident to arrest
exception because articles within a passenger compartment of an
automobile are "generally, even if not inevitably," within the im-
mediate control of the suspect.oo But this is simply not true
under the facts of Belton. For Belton, under arrest outside the
90. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
91. Id. at 763.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
95. Id. at 236.
96. Id. at 235.
97. 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2, at 265 (1978).
98. Id. at 263.
99. See id. at 262-70.
100. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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automobile, to reach inside the automobile and unzip the pocket
of a jacket in the backseat, he would need "the skill of Houdini
and the strength of Hercules."ol The Court in Belton chose to
abandon a case-by-case analysis in favor of a "bright-line" rule
which maintains that the inside of an automobile is always within
the reach of a suspect.102 But this flatly contradicts the Chimel
rationale which was based on an analysis of the area a suspect
could actually reach, and not the parameters defined by an office,
a home, or the interior of an automobile.
0 3
Nor can Belton be justified under the Court's rationale in Robin-
son which focused on the suspect's reduced expectation of pri-
vacy after arrest.104 United States v. Chadwick105 addressed the
issue of searches of closed containers during a search incident to
arrest. Applying Chimel, the Court in Chadwick stated that if a
container not on the immediate person was reduced to the control
of the police it could not be opened without a warrant. 06 The ra-
tionale was that an individual retains an expectation of privacy in
closed containers that is not extinguished by the intrusion of the
arrest.107 Therefore, alternatives available to the police, such as
seizure, were preferable to a warrantless search.108 The Belton
holding cannot be justified under the Robinson rationale of re-
duced expectation of privacy because under Chadwick and Sand-
ers, an individual has a high expectation of privacy in closed
containers.109 Because the container was under the policeman's
exclusive control,"10 Chadwick requires that a warrant be ob-
tained. Yet, the Supreme Court allowed the warrantless search in
101. United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting).
102. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
103. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
104. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
105. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id. at 16 n.10.
Unlike searches of the person, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), searches of posses-
sions within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any re-
duced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. [Chadwick's] privacy
interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply be-
cause [he was] under arrest.
Id.
108. 433 U.S. at 13.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 3644.
110. The New York Court of Appeals found that, under the facts in Belton, the
police officer had gained exclusive control of Belton's jacket by searching it and
Belton. The only reasonable explanation for the Court's decision
is the rationale later found implicit in United States v. Ross."'1
The Belton rationale unjustifiably expands the search incident
to arrest exception. This expansion cannot be justified because
the facts in Belton directly contradict the essence of Chimel-that
the search be related to preventive self-defense or preservation of
evidence. The practical effect of such expansion is dangerous.
Allowing police officers to search the entire passenger compart-
ment and closed containers therein may not always be necessary
to preserve evidence and protect the officer's safety: such a
"bright-line" rule invites serious invasion of areas and articles in
which an automobile occupant has a high expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, this rule could result in a police officer manufac-
turing grounds for arrest. Under Belton, an officer may legally
stop an automobile for a minor offense such as speeding and
place the driver under arrest for the sole purpose of conducting a
thorough search of the car-a search for which no probable cause
exists. These so-called "pretextual arrests" could increase under
Belton since the scope of a search incident to such an arrest is
much broader than that afforded by both the pre-Ross movable
vehicle exception and the pre-Belton search incident to arrest ex-
ception. However, greater danger of pretextual arrests exists un-
der Belton because probable cause to believe that contraband is
located in the automobile is not required to conduct a warrantless
search.
Furthermore, the Ross exception is based on the peculiarity of
the automobile, and therefore, the rules governing searches of
automobiles are distinct from rules governing other types of war-
rantless searches. Given this premise, all searches involving
automobiles must be resolved under this exception to preserve a
consistent application of fourth amendment principles. Thus, the
holding in Belton not only foreshadows Ross, it should more prop-
erly be seen as an exercise of the "search pursuant to the auto-
mobile" exception.
Consequently, the search incident to arrest exception should be
narrowly construed, and its dangerous expansion in Belton
should be overruled. The reasonableness of all full-scale automo-
bile searches should instead be governed by Ross, which requires
probable cause to believe contraband is located in the vehicle. Al-
though the Ross expansion increases police power to conduct
warrantless searches and, arguably, correspondingly increases
seizing the contents of the pocket. 50 N.Y.2d 447, 451; 407 N.E.2d 420, 422; 429
N.Y.S.2d 574, 577 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
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the potential for abuse of individual rights, it is preferable to the
expansion of the search incident to arrest exception found in
Belton.
CONCLUSION
United States v. Ross held that police officers may search an en-
tire automobile, including closed containers therein, without a
warrant if they have probable cause to believe the automobile
contains contraband.
Due to the widespread use of automobiles, the large number of
police/automobile confrontations, and the propensity of criminals
to hide contraband in automobiles, the Court has implicitly cre-
ated an exception to the warrant requirement. This exception-a
"search pursuant to the automobile" exception-finds its justifica-
tion in the peculiarity of the automobile itself and rejects the
traditional rationales behind the movable vehicle exception. The
new rationale is not based on any single aspect of the automobile,
such as mobility or privacy, but rather on the practical nature of a
search of the automobile. Therefore, the scope of the search in
Ross is not contingent on any one factor. Instead, the warrantless
search is allowed solely because an automobile is involved. A
warrant is required if there is no automobile or if the closed
container is only "incidentally" connected to the automobile.
The Court's holding in Ross yields positive and negative results.
The Court has simplified the police officer's job by allowing an en-
tire automobile to be searched any time there is probable cause
to believe that it contains contraband. It may also be argued that
police officers who have valid probable cause to believe that con-
traband is hidden in an automobile should not be denied the effi-
ciency of an on-the-spot search of the entire car, including closed
containers in which the contraband is likely to be concealed.
However, efficiency is not an interest which justifies the dismissal
of an individual's fourth amendment rights.112
The "search pursuant to the automobile" exception is far-
reaching in its effect. It compels an overruling of the rationale in
New York v. Belton. Belton, like Ross, cannot be supported by
112. "Of course, efficiency and promptness can never be substituted for due
process and adherence to the Constitution. Is not a dictatorship the most 'effi-
cient' form of government?" United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2181 n.13 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
traditional rationales. Since Belton can be seen as foreshadowing
Ross, and because the "search pursuant to the automobile" ex-
ception must logically encompass all searches involving
automobiles, Belton must be analyzed in accordance with Ross.
Therefore, the rationale in Belton relying on the search incident
to arrest exception must be rejected in favor of a rationale consis-
tent with the "search pursuant to the automobile" exception
based on the peculiarity of the automobile.
While the holding in United States v. Ross may sometimes re-
sult in unjustifiable searches, it at least requires probable cause
prior to the full-scale search of an automobile. The potential for
abuse of the individual's fourth amendment rights is much
greater if the rationale of New York v. Belton is not rejected and
replaced with a justification consistent with the probable cause
requirement of the "search pursuant to the automobile"
exception.
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